DD/MGS 74-0314

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

Badge Machine Briefing SUBJECT

The DD/M&S and the ADD/M&S have expressed an interest in receiving a one-hour comprehensive briefing on all aspects of our program for acquiring a badge machine. There is no urgency in immediately arranging for the briefing, but the technical officer should be present to provide an in-depth review on the contract, specifications, coordination, problem areas, etc. The suggestion was made that the meeting should be scheduled for early in the week of 10 February 1974.

Executive Officer to the Deputy Director for Management and Services

EO-DD/M&S: kmg (29 Jan 74) Distribution:

Orig - Adse - DD/M&S Subj 1 - DD/M&S Chrono STA^{*}

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	ROUTING AN	1D RECORD	SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional) Response to and the As	to a DDM&S Inq	uiry Abou	t IBM Badge Readers
	gency SACS		14-13-13
FROM:	\Box	EXTENSION	NO.
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TO: (Officer designation, room number,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		WAIT & LIST.
building)		INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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			to the IBM Badge Reader. I
4.			think it says that we have already
			investigated it and have elected not to use it as part of the
5.			system. You may g
			interpretation from Divorperone100130004-9

DD/M&S 74-1156

MAR 27 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

SUBJECT : Response to a DDM&S Inquiry About

IBM Badge Readers and the Agency

SACS

- 1. It is understood that Mr. Brownman advised Mr. that IBM Corporation has a badge reader system which may be appropriate for consideration as a component in the Agency Security Access Control System. This inquiry was then passed to the Office of Security and the program COTR.
- 2. IBM Corporation submitted an excellent proposal in competition for the award of the SACS contract. Included was the suggested utilization of a badge-read assembly designed by the IBM Advanced System Development Laboratory in Los Gatos, California.
- 3. The fundamental premise leading to the selection of RFP recipients was that only systems capability would be considered to the exclusion of assembling piecemeal components. Since the award of the contract, numerous contributions and brochures have been received addressing alternative components, complementary sub-systems (badges and badge-makers) as well as next generation proposals. As a matter of courtesy and technical cataloguing, each submission is reviewed as a potentially useful item or for application to other technical programs in development.
- 4. Although IBM has marketed several successful card systems including the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system, it was felt that the proposed IBM system which included 28,000 hours of direct labor required considerable adaption of existing systems.
- 5. The prime contractor has systems responsibility which may include a market survey and competitive technical evaluation of components for optimum performance and integration into the total system.

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COMPLETATION	
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DD/MES Registry
File security 5

Chief, Information Systems Analysis Staff 2E 42 Hqs

ΑТ

Per our discussion of 18 March 1974, please develop what you can concerning IBM card readers and related technology which might be used in connection with the badge machine program of OS. It is understood that IBM has made some significant advances in this field, and we want to be sure it has been adequately considered in our badge program.

Suspense: 29 March 1974.

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ΑТ	Executive Officer to the DD/M&S 7D 26 Hqs	19 Ma	ır
ΑТ	EO-DD/M&S: kmg (19 Mar 74) Distribution: Orig - C/ISAS by hand 1 - DD/M&S Subject 1 - DD/M&S Chrono		

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FILE

DD/S 73-0603

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT

: Badge Machine

Oz:

I have your 2 February paper to Director of Logistics. After reading the specifications as set forth in the documentation of the attachment, I'm less sure about the whole exercise. There may (must) be a basic study which underlies this concept - in other words: Why a badge machine at all? What advantages or savings do we anticipate?

Also, I'm not sure what is meant by the note on the routing sheet regarding "funding determination". I think I recall talking about \$250,000 as a ball park figure but no numbers appear in this paper. Is this a prototype cost or production run of x number of machines?

Despite the fact that a meeting in my office caused this paper to be produced, now that I see it, I must ask that we go back to basics - "Why?".

Robert S. Wattles

ADD/S:RSW/ms (15 Feb 73)

Distribution:

Orig - Adse, w/O of DD/S 73-0440

1 - D/S, w/4 of DD/S 73-0440 - 2/16 D/S. (2/15/73)

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*Orig was handcarried by Mr. Wattles to Director of Security for discussion. Memo with attachment was left with

DD/S 73-0440: Memo dtd 2 Feb 73 for D/L, Attn: C/Procurement Div, Thru: DD/S,. fr D/S, subj: Procurement: Security Access Control System

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006900130004-9

ΆΤ

7 February 1973

Mr. Wattles:

I don't understand the note on the routing sheet. What funding determination? How can we talk about funds until we know how much it's going to cost? Shouldn't Security be telling us how much this is going to cost and whether, in fact, it is cost effective?

The proposal itself reads like Security already has the system designed. They are specifying that a badge will be used with a color photograph, and all of the general characteristics of the existing badge. They want the system to be electrical and computer based, etc., etc. In short, the specifications seem to go much too far. They are so detailed that they place severe constraints on what we are likely to get. The contractors are being asked to give us what Security thinks they want rather than being asked to develop a system which will satisfy security requirements. The basic security requirement is to prevent unauthorized people from getting into the building. We concentrate on people who are authorized to enter; one wonders what might happen if we concentrated on identifying those who are not, or even if you can do one without the other.

There is no intention of eliminating the guard posts. One of the requirements of the system is that there be one guard present at each entry to check up on the machine and to prevent people from jumping the barrier. Why bother with a machine? Can such a system really be cost effective?

There are at least a dozen other questions, but I don't know why you asked for this.

RHW

Questions

Security Access Control System

- 1. What is the history to date on the Office of Security's attempts to secure a 'badge machine.''
 - how many previous industry proposals have been looked at - reasons for rejections
 - how much has OS spent in \$ and hours on the 'badge machine' project to date.
- 2. Probability of not or of needing intra-building "security access control systems" -- won't experience factor over next 1 2 years in compartmented areas without the barriers have produced a reliable 'people system" for identifying people with correct indicators to etner compartmented all source areas. Maybe OS is planning for something we don't need -- is OS going to "security overkill" in intra-building security access control devices?
- 3. What level of \$ funding is implied in this document -- no dollar figures are mentioned re the Requests for Proposals.
- 4. Are we not really talking about software development mainly -since OS proposes that existing off-the-shelf hardware be used. Which of
 the "expect" companies would tie software development to their own hardware?
- 5. If existing hardware is to be used -- what does OS mean by "Upon evaluation of the requested system, follow on production may include more entrances..." OS is not proposing hardware prototype development are they? Or are they? If so is this contradictory to their earlier statement about using unclassified existing hardware?
 - 6. Availability = $\frac{MTBF}{MTBF + MTTR}$

The equation is not explained in the paper but it means:

Availability = Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)

Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) +

Mean Time To Restore (MTTR) (after a failure).

- 7. What effect will the operation of this system have on the Central Badge Office?
- 8. No where does OS outline the planned dollar costs of the completed (or even early stage) Security Access Control System -- what will the Agency save in terms of
 - dollars (against dollar cost)
 - guards returned to GSA.

What are we buying in terms of security? How much better will this system be than the present eye check by guards? How many failures are there on the part of guards? How much better in terms of rate of failure will the machine system be? Will the machine system be doing a 1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, x% better job than guards for how much less (more) than the guards are doing right now?

- 9. Who will adopt the industry software system to Agency computer systems -- or will OS have a separate computer system of its own managing the data base? Does OCS know or have they had input in this project? Will SIPS Task Force follow on be involved in system maintenance?
- 10. Will any new dedicated power sources (generators) be required to back up the automated system? What is OS contingency plan if automated system should become inoperable?
- 11. When we find out how much we are to spend on this system -- over how long a period will we have to budget for the system?
- 12. What is the priority of this project in light of dollar cost (when known) in relation to other OS programs and other DD/S programs?
- 13. What are the alternatives re physical security in next 5-10 years if we do not have a Security Access Control System. What risks does Agency face if we don't have a Security Access Control System (risks by alternative). What are dollar cost relationship between all alternatives?
- 14. What is OS and/or DD/S giving up (other uses of dollars) if we go out and procure an automated Security Access Control System?

-3-

15. Procurement Division says there is no actual funding involved in going out with a Request for Proposal. OL would like to give the 'bidders' a feel for what type of a buy (# of units, software) is planned if a proposal is accepted. But the basic problem we have is - what if we get a sound proposal for x dollars -- shouldn't OS now have an idea of what the finished system will cost the taxpayer before we go out for proposals -- this information is not present.

ed For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00 Mr

Re Mr. Osborn's note on the Routing Sheet: I don't have back-ground material unless this is related to "system modification, changes in Security Audit System". Can you please help identify?

markathy promise

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2.			٠.	for ADD/S ' consideration in accordance with conclusions reached during discussion on
3. *	·			28 February between Messrs. Wattles,
4. Director of Logistics Attn: C/Procurement D	iv.			
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DD/S 73-0440

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2 FEB 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics

ATTENTION

: Chief, Procurement Division

THR OUGH

: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT

: Procurement: Security Access Control

System

- security access control system which will authenticate legitimate Agency badges and will link an authenticated badge to the unique bearer. The badge system should be delivered, installed, and initially maintained for use in entering the Headquarters building with a potential to expand eventually to include intra-building compartmented areas and the remote metropolitan area buildings. All the requirements of the current Agency badge program must be considered and incorporated into the new system. Maximum reliability commensurate with system sophistication must be achieved.
- 2. The basic Request for Proposal (RFP) documentation provided by the Office of Security will be presented to bidders with demonstrated performance to allow maximum creativity in adapting concepts and hardware to the requirements.
- 3. It is suggested that the following be considered experts and appropriate recipients of the RFP. All those listed below have proven capability as each has marketed reliable systems with good user acceptance in either the security access control or the machine credit card field.

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	unclassified RFP which has been by the Office of Security and Mr.
6. For any additional contact Mr. on extension	technical information please
	Howard J. (Øsborn Director of Security
Att.	
CONCURRENCE:	
is/ Robert S. Wattles	2 MAR 1973
John W. Coffey Deputy Director for Support	Date

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